

Slykov

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

~~KAPOK~~

AIR

VIA: \_\_\_\_\_  
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REF-9968

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REF CSN 43-43

**SECRET**  
Security Information  
CLASSIFICATION

AUG 21 1953

~~AUG 14 1953~~

TO : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
ATTN: REDSON/Murkin

FROM : Chief, SM

SUBJECT: GENERAL - REDSON/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC - Contact and Briefing CASSOWARY 2 Prior to European Trip.

REF: Attachment "A", under separate cover.

AM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
AB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BX	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
NPD	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Participants: CASSOWARY 2, ☐

CASSOWARY 15, ☐

1. With the arrival of ☐ the meeting was launched on a discussion of a study submitted by CASSOWARY 2 for KUGONE consideration. The paper was noted by ☐ as being entirely too long, not fulfilling a specific purpose, too broad in scope, confusing, and having a decided lack of forcefulness. It would have been better, ☐ stated, had the effort been limited to the CAMPORE psychological warfare problem.

CASSOWARY 2 replied that the paper was not his, but had been given to him by an individual, from the Eastern part of the CAMPORE territory, who was a product of the Soviet regime. CASSOWARY 2 felt that this work should be interesting in that it would afford some insight into the Soviet mentality. He further stated that he purposely did not want to correct the paper, feeling that it would destroy some of its effectiveness.

2. From the paper, the discussion then moved to the Foreign Policy of Identity A. Here ☐ noted to CASSOWARY 2 that "a great deal can be done on non-pre-determination and self-determination." He added that although Identity A cannot recognize any USSR states, with the exception of the Baltic areas, in its overt policy, it could offer positive aid in the covert field. ☐ cited the covert cooperation with CASSOWARY 1

SR/CPP EH

EE/PP ☐

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Removed from Project Aerodynamic

CS Classification: 74-124-29/3

JOB # 69-425/83

Box: 20 Fold: 7

FORM NO. 51-28  
JUN 1949

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CLASSIFICATION

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74-124-29/3 (282)

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# REPORT

[ ] countered, stating that he was thinking in terms of CASSOWARY 2. He advised that CANNPORE should support CASSOWARY 2, noting specifically that he, CASSOWARY 2, was in official contact with Identity A. He asked CASSOWARY 2 to ignore the cries of the misinformed emigre pseudo-politicos who reasoned that because such controversial Ukrainian emigres as OULAI, BOHARTYRCHUK, BOLENKO, and Taras BULBA-BOROVETS were granted audiences with ODACID and ODEARL, this did not constitute a carte blanche recognition of these factions.

CASSOWARY 2 said he understood the covert relationship, but felt that on the other hand the overt relationship was not aiding the Ukrainian cause; if anything, he added, it was doing it harm. He added that the official stand taken by BG CANOE was inconsistent on the self-determination principle as discussed the previous year. AE ACTIVE was brought in as another example of the deviation in the self-determination principle by noting that the group was Great Russian dominated.

[ ] reiterated his previous statement on the private nature of AE ACTIVE and unofficial Identity A interest in that organization. He reflected that he had looked over AE ACTIVE's political efforts in Germany and remarked that it was characterized by the lack of accomplishments. He added, "There is nothing that Identity A can do but advise ... In the final analysis, if you (CASSOWARY 2) can produce more, and confidence is built up in you, your position with Identity A will be undisputed. You are in contact with CANNPORE."

CASSOWARY 2 said it was in the best interest of CASSOWARY 1 and Identity A to keep CANNPORE alive. It was necessary to do everything possible on both sides in order to insure moral and material assistance and not weaken the will to fight by use of material from TPLINGO and BG CANOE which is contrary to what is propagandized by CANNPORE. He asked Identity A to "come to a clear position -- either support the Liberation Movement ... (or) keep to the preservation of FJSTEEL."

[ ] admitted that he did not know, but stated that when the present administration took office it announced a policy of liberation. He noted that Identity A was in an awkward position and that only "time and place" would decide the support to be given. [ ] used as an example the recent East German riots, in which it would have been very inopportune for Identity A to offer overt aid for an uprising. As for the Ukrainian situation, should a revolt be fermented tomorrow, [ ] said, Identity A could not send tanks, but it could increase courier traffic into the Ukraine with supplies. It is therefore imperative, he continued, that more strategic intelligence be transmitted from CANNPORE. "We know of the contact, but it has not shown any positive results."

In recapitulation, [ ] said he wished to explore the stand of Identity A to determine the status of the Ukraine vis-a-vis the USSR satellites. The position of the Ukraine was uncertain, while the satellites are sure of support and recognition. Then returning to AE ACTIVE, CASSOWARY 2 asked, "Are the machinations of private committees reflecting Identity A's attitude?"

He agreed with [ ] on the intelligence aspects of the operation, and said he would write to CAWNPORE. The text of the letter would tell CAWNPORE to supply specific intelligence as per our needs. When this intelligence is received, CASSOWARY 2 said he would then check the attitude of Identity A. However, he said that it was imperative that CAWNPORE does not over-extend its capabilities and jeopardize the safety of the people inside. He felt that the reluctant position adopted by CAWNPORE in gathering intelligence against specific targets was brought about by (a) difficult, untenable military situations, i.e., oblavas; and (b) misinformation about the present situation at home and abroad disseminated by JAVELIN.

CASSOWARY 2 felt that the next set of messages from CAWNPORE would clarify the internal situation.

In order to establish the bona fides of the CASSOWARY 1 mandate, CASSOWARY 2 asked the Case Officers concerned to intercede in his behalf with JAVELIN. As for CAVATINA 1, CASSOWARY 2 felt that he would have some difficulty in convincing the CAVATINA leader to honor the CASSOWARY 1 mandate, but felt sure that he would win the support of many CAVATINA 1 followers

[ ]

MR:gc(17 August 1953)

Distribution:

- 3 - COM, w/att under separate cover
- 2 - CSOB, w/att under separate cover
- 1 - RI, w/att (retained in SR/3 file)
- 2 - SR/3, w/att

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**893M-9968**

**Attachment "A"**

**Identity A: That which pertains to the United States Government.**

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11/11/70

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*S/c att 1 to EGOW  
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